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1.  ABSTRACT.
This working paper examines monetary aggregates as means of explaining economic activity. 
Comparative analysis of the Great Depression and the years 2007-11 is used to test the explanatory 
power of monetary aggregates in accordance with their use in monetarist explanations of the Great 
Depression. A conclusion from this analysis is that monetarist theory can structure monetary-aggregate 
data to produce useful insights about economic activity for the years 2007-11.
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1. INTRODUCTION.
US economic activity during 2007-11 is unique among years since the end of WWII. A decline 
in economic activity followed by its persistence below trend is evident. The last similar period of 
economic activity in the US is the Great Depression of the 1930s. An additional commonality is both 
periods are associated with historically large private debt levels followed by financial instability. A 
comparison between these periods is therefore relevant.
The Great Depression caused a paradigm shift within the economics profession. Economists 
working after the war required conformity from theory to economic relationships revealed during the 
depression. This requirement generated consistency among the results of scholarship, and separated this 
period's scholarship from scholarship that preceded the depression.
The motivation of this working paper's analysis is that economic activity since 2007 will 
generate similar, although weaker, forces within scholarship to those which followed the Great 
Depression. This working paper is a result from reengaging with some of the early post-war economic 
literature, and applying directly its methods of analysis to developments in the years 2007-11. The 
economic literature surveyed for this working paper is in many ways the product of a similar survey of 
earlier methods by its authors.1 
Economists begin to apply seriously analysis of monetary aggregates as means of explaining the 
Great Depression in the early post-war years. They present analysis showing that measures of 
economic activity are correlated with measures of the price level and money aggregates. The 
explanations for US economic activity through prices and money by Friedman and Schwartz, especially 
their representation of the Great Depression, is lucid and compelling.2 It is a classic application of 
monetarist theory. They show that prices and a money aggregate both sharply decline as large numbers 
of banks fail in the early 1930s, while at the same time measures of economic activity continue to 
1 See Friedman (1970).
2 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
1
worsen broadly. This is the starting point for this working paper's analysis.
The structure of this working paper follows: this introduction followed by an exploration of the 
data, a brief analysis of these data as means of explanation, a summary of conclusions, a list of 
references used in this analysis, and a listing of the data and their sources.
2. EXPLORATION OF THE DATA.
Table 1 compares economic measures and other elements relevant to an economic system for 
the Great Depression and the years 2007-11. It is immediately apparent from Table 1 that measures 
decline much more severely and persistently during the Great Depression. Some direct comparisons of 
standard economic measures are not possible, unfortunately. Collection of many measures of economic 
activity in use today begins only as theory develops in response to the Great Depression. For example, 
there is no measure of unemployment for the US during the Great Depression comparable to current 
measures. Additionally, economists working with national-account systems at one time focused 
primarily on GNP, rather than on GDP. Much more contemporary analysis for the measure GNP is 
available.3 These differences illustrate the importance of theory to even mundane matters of economic 
analysis.
Item 1 in Table 1 displays information about the monetary system in place during each period. 
The monetary authority in both periods is the Federal Reserve System, but there are important 
differences in the monetary regime, policy mission, and policy constraints. Firstly, the US recognized 
the right of private individuals to exchange its currency for a fixed amount of gold until April 1933.4 
One important feature of all fixed exchange-rate systems is that they restrict discretionary control of the 
money supply by a monetary authority. The US recognized no obligation to exchange its currency at 
fixed rates in the years 2007-11. The differences between these two monetary regimes can engender 
3 Table 1 reports GNP as the measure of output for the Great Depression and GDP for the years 2007-11.
4 Private holdings of monetary gold in the US were outlawed by executive order in April 1933. See Barber (1996).
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different responses to identical economic conditions by the same monetary authority pursuing the same 
policy objectives.
Secondly, there is no explicit policy mission statement for the monetary authority during the 
Great Depression. No explicit constraints with respect to policy exist for this period, either. Both a 
policy mission statement and constraints that support a political system's economic objectives are 
important, in order to ensure relevant and desirable responses from a monetary authority. Ambiguity 
with respect to policy characterizes the monetary authority during the Great Depression.
The Federal Reserve System has a policy mission statement for the years 2007-11. This policy 
mission is subject to the constraints of maximum employment, price-level stability, and moderate long-
term interest rates. The first constraint obligates the monetary authority to pursue its mission while 
balancing any effects identified on employment; the second constraint includes deflation as well as 
inflation.
Item 2 in Table 1 lists measures of total economic output for the two periods. Declines are more 
severe and persistent during the Great Depression than for the years 2007-11.5 Item 3 allows no 
comparison of unemployment rates. Item 4 shows the greatest decline from the pre-recessionary peak 
in quarterly averages of a stock-price index. This measure was of greater importance anecdotally to 
contemporaries of the Great Depression, although ownership of stock equity is more widespread during 
the years 2007-11. The decline is almost twice as great during the Great Depression.
Item 5 in Table 1 compares declines in the price level that are concurrent with declines in output 
for the two periods.6 There is a striking difference between the two periods, with the price level falling 
sharply and persistently during the Great Depression. Item 6 compares changes in the high-powered 
money aggregate coincident with the two downturns in output; both are of short duration, but the size 
of the decline is larger during the Great Depression. Item 7 shows a relationship for the monetary 
5 The duration of below-trend real output is inconclusive thru 2011.
6 Measure of the price level is the implicit deflator for the respective measure of output.
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aggregate “M1” similar to the price level in item 5. Item 8 compares the number of bank failures in 
years where both the quarterly price level and output declined. There is again a striking difference 
between the two periods; the number of bank failures during the Great Depression is much greater. The 
measures in items 5-8 of Table 1 are important to monetarist explanations of the Great Depression. 
They are the focus of analysis in this working paper.
Figure 1 depicts the money aggregate “M1” (M), the high-powered money aggregate (H), the 
ratio of checkable deposits to currency (D/C), and the ratio of checkable deposits to reserves (D/R), all 
for the years 1959-2011. These are central to monetarist explanations of price-level changes, and hence 
to its explanations of broader economic activity. Figure 1 shows that there is no discernible deviation of 
“M” or “D/C” from their respective trends for the years 2007-11, whereas there is discernible deviation 
for “H” and “D/R”.7 These relationships are the objects of further analysis in this working paper.
3. ANALYSIS.
The monetarist explanations for the Great Depression's severity and persistence are supported 
broadly by the data in Table 1. A brief recitation of these explanations follows: subsequent to a 
downturn in economic activity, a large number of banks failed, causing downward pressure on the 
supply of money, to which the monetary authority did/could not respond. Decline in the price level 
ensued, generating further sustained, downward pressures on broader economic activity. It is 
noteworthy that the monetary regime contemporary with the downturn period of the Great Depression, 
and the absence of a policy mission and policy constraints, afforded few options to the monetary 
authority without direct intervention by higher political authorities.8
Analysis continues by examining whether or not data for the years after the classic expositions 
of monetarism are consistent with the following monetarist explanations for the Great Depression: (1), 
7 Trend is calculated for each measure with respect to time thru 2007.
8 President Hoover supported publicly the conversion of currency to gold at fixed rates of exchange. See Brands (2008).
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the severity and persistence of the Great Depression is attributed to a large and persistent fall in the 
price level; and (2), changes in the price level are a monetary phenomenon. Correlation of the price 
level with the money aggregate “M” and real output is listed in Table 2 for the years 1959-2011.9 These 
correlations do not support rejection of the monetarist hypothesis that changes in the price level are a 
monetary phenomenon and that they have real economic consequences.
Table 1 shows no large decline in the price level for the years 2007-11, and Figure 1 depicts no 
discernible deviation of the money aggregate “M” from its trend. A weak monetarist conclusion would 
attribute the lower severity and weaker persistence of declines in measures of economic activity for the 
years 2007-11 to stability in the price level. A strong monetarist conclusion would attribute this directly 
to stability in the money aggregate “M”. The data for the years 2007-11 do not support rejection of 
monetarist explanations for the Great Depression.
Stability in the money aggregate “M” for the years 2007-11 can be examined further using the 
following identity relation:
(1)
, where, per monetarist explanations of the Great Depression, “H” is attributed behaviorally to the 
monetary authority, “D/C” to individuals, and “D/R” to financial intermediaries.10 Figure 1 shows that 
“D/C” does not deviate from its trend for the years 2007-11; analysis continues with “H” and “D/R”.
Figure 1 shows for the years 2007-11 no discernible deviation of the money aggregate “M” 
from its trend, while the high-powered money aggregate deviates positively, and the ratio “D/R” 
deviates negatively. Following from the identity relation in equation (1) and monetarist explanations of 
the Great Depression, behavior by the monetary authority (ΔH) completely offsets behavior by 
financial intermediaries (ΔD/R), keeping the money aggregate “M” stable. A monetarist interpretation 
9 Measure of the price level is the implicit GDP deflator.
10 See Temin (1976).
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(D/R + D/C)
M = H ∙ 
D/R ∙ (1 + D/C)
of observed price stability during the years 2007-11 is that the money aggregate “M” is stable with 
respect to its trend. This interpretation supports the assertion that the monetary authority acts within its 
second constraint to deliver price stability. Achievement of its stated policy mission, subject to the first 
constraint of maximum employment, is supported by the monetarist interpretation that behavior of the 
monetary authority averted a large decline in the price level, by way of averting a large decline in the 
money aggregate “M”, thereby minimizing decline in economic output. The monetary authority is 
maintaining simply the trend growth in the money aggregate “M” by adjusting growth in the high-
powered money aggregate, delivering jointly price stability and support to broader economic activity. 
The data for the years 2007-11 do not support rejecting these interpretations.
The other discernible behavior per monetarist explanations of the Great Depression depicted in 
Figure 1 is by financial intermediaries, through the ratio “D/R”. A reasonable assumption within the 
framework of monetarist theory is that “D/R” will remain stable in the absence of great stress to the 
banking system. Competition and the opportunity cost of reserves to banks makes this assumption 
reasonable. The opportunity cost of reserves is expressed in the following equation:
(2) OCR = R ∙ (1 + r)t - R,
which is the interest income forgone. One possible explanation for instability in “D/R” is that as r→0, 
so does the opportunity cost associated with reserves. When the interest rate is low, “D/R” could be less 
stable. If so, this is a behavioral foundation for a limitation to policy response by a monetary authority.
An interesting debate about monetary policy in the 1930s concerns reserve requirements equal 
to 100% of deposits, where “D/R” is equal to 1, as a means to achieving near-perfect control of the 
money supply by the monetary authority.11 The ratio “D/R” is less than 1 in the years 2009-11. This 
affords the monetary authority with a risk-free alternative to increasing high-powered money in order 
11 See Barber (1996).
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to increase the money aggregate “M”.
Other possible explanations for instability in “D/R” include imperfect competition in money 
markets and an insufficient quantity of good-quality borrowers. Regardless, a conclusion from 
monetarist theory is that instability in “D/R” necessitates action by the monetary authority to adjust 
“H”, so as to maintain stability in “M”, in order to deliver joint stability in the price level and economic 
activity. Data for the years 2007-11 do not support rejection of this conclusion.
The comparison of bank failures in item 8 of Table 1 shows that there are far fewer bank 
failures corresponding to the period of both price-level and output declines for the years 2007-11. The 
Federal Reserve System's policy response includes large purchases of bank assets during the years 
2007-11. A monetarist interpretation is that the monetary authority prevented large and persistent 
decline in the price level by preventing bank failures through its purchases of bank assets. This 
interpretation of the consequences stemming from the monetary authority's behavior is consistent with 
its policy mission and policy constraints. It suggests preemptive action informed by an analysis 
consistent with monetarist theory.
Figure 2 depicts a short-run relationship between supply and demand for real quantities of 
money. The supply relationship, MS=f(H,D/C,D/R), restates generally the identity relation in equation 
(1), where changes to “H”, “D/C”, or “D/R” cause a shift of the supply curve depicted vertically in 
Figure 2. The demand relationship is a simple abstraction of the relationship between demand for 
money and both the interest rate (r) and a measure of total output (Y). The demand relationship with 
respect to the interest rate is an explicit movement along the downward-sloping demand curve, whereas 
a positive (negative) change in “Y” causes a positive (negative) shift of the demand curve. Price is 
expressed in real terms (r-π) to correspond with quantity expressed in real terms (M/P). Figure 2 is 
broadly consistent with many expositions of a market for money, and it can depict graphically the 
consequences of many relationships analyzed in this working paper.
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4. CONCLUSIONS.
There are important differences in the monetary system during the Great Depression and the 
years 2007-11. The monetary regime during the Great Depression greatly restricts the options of the 
monetary authority to respond to declines in either money aggregates or the price level. This is not true 
for the years 2007-11. Further, a policy mission statement and policy constraints are in place for the 
years 2007-11, requiring the monetary authority to consider explicitly maximum employment and price 
stability. The response during the years 2007-11 is consistent with the monetary authority's policy 
mission and policy constraints.
Exploratory analysis of the data demonstrated differences between the Great Depression and the 
years 2007-11. Most importantly, the severity and persistence of declines in measures of economic 
output are much worse during the Great Depression. The data are consistent with monetarist 
explanations for the Great Depression, as price levels and the money aggregate “M” both decline 
sharply and persistently during the Great Depression. These measures do not decline severely or 
persistently for the years 2007-11, which does not conflict with monetarist explanations of the Great 
Depression.
The use of monetary aggregates and economic theory that does not provide explicit proofs for 
its assumptions is not popular currently. This paper's analysis produces insights without subjecting its 
working assumptions to rigorous skepticism. A simple test of the assumptions, using data from years 
subsequent to when those assumptions were first developed, does not reject them. The literature 
surveyed for this working paper is in many ways a response by its authors to directions in economic 
theory contemporary with the authors. It is noteworthy that there is an economic literature rich in both 
explanatory power and simplicity that was produced in response to the Great Depression.
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5. TABLES AND FIGURES.
(A) TABLES 1-2.
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2007-11*
1.A
1.B
1.C N/A
1.D N/A
2.A 53.4% 3.9%
2.B 36.2% 5.1%
2.C 12.7% 3.5%
2.D 14 6
2.E 48 +16
3.A N/A 5.1%
3.B N/A +14
4. 84.8% 42.6%
5.A 26.9% 0.1%
5.B 8.8% 0.4%
5.C 14 1
6.A 3.6% 0.1%
6.B 7.2% 0.6%
6.C 2 1
7.A 27.9% 0.9%
7.B 8.6% 1.9%
7.C 15 2
8. 9,805 140
** 1929-33; 2009.
TABLE 1: Comparison between the Great Depression and 2007-11
Item Measure / Element Great Depression
Monetary authority Federal Reserve System Federal Reserve System
Monetary regime
Gold standard (to April 
1933) Fiat money
Monetary authority's policy mission statement
Maintain long-run growth of 
the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate 
with the economy's long-run 
potential to increase 
production
Monetary authority's policy constraints
Maximum employment, 
price stability, moderate 
long-run interest rates
Decline in nominal output
Decline in real output
Rate of decline in real output (annualized)
Duration of decline in real output
Duration of below-trend real output
Increase in unemployment rate
Duration of elevated unemployment rate
Maximum decline in DJIA index of stock 
prices
Decline in price level
Rate of decline in price level (annualized)
Duration of decline in price level
Decline in high-powered money
Rate of decline in high-powered money 
(annualized)
Duration of decline in high-powered money
Decline in money (M1)
Rate of decline in money (M1 (annualized))
Duration of decline in money (M1)
Number of bank failures during period of 
decline in price level**
Periodicity of items 1-7 is quarterly; item 8 is annually.
* Some measures are provisional as they remain depressed into 2012. Those measures are depicted thru 2011 by the prefix '+'.
(B) FIGURES 1-2.
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FIGURE 1.A: Monetary Aggregate M
(1959-2011)
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FIGURE 1.B: Monetary Aggregate H
(1959-2011)
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FIGURE 1.C: Monetary Ratio D/C
(1959-2011)
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FIGURE 1.D: Monetary Ratio D/R
(1959-2011)
P
M 97.5%
Y 98.2%
TABLE 2: 
Correlation 
with Price 
Level, 
1959-2011
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FIGURE 2: MS(H,D/C,D/R) = MD(Y,r)
M / P
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